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OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS FROM THE
PROFESSIONAL PILOTS PERSPECTIVE
CAPTAIN J. J. O'DONNELL*
N SELECTING the various topics for the Tenth Annual
Symposium of the Journal of Air Law and Commerce, the
Symposium Editors made a value judgment which tracks one that
has become increasingly apparent to the Air Line Pilots Associa-
tion. The approach and landing phase of flight, while representing
only three percent of the flying time, represents a staggering propor-
tion of the avoidable accidents in commercial aviation. It is also
the phase of flight in which little, if any, progress has been made
in terms of accident prevention. There is only one positive observa-
tion which can be made: from at least one perspective, there has
been a high degree of success in the landing phase of flight from
the inception of aviation ... we have never left one up there! In
too many instances, this statistic has seemed to satisfy those charged
by law with regulating and promoting air safety.
You have probably noticed that I have not mentioned the legal
ramifications of air safety. Nor will I. There are two reasons why
this is the case. First and foremost, the Air Line Pilots Association's
concern is more basic and immediate. An accident can ruin a
crew's entire day! The second is that I have been advised that it is
axiomatic in the legal profession that anyone who represents him-
self has a fool for a client. Clearly, the only bigger fool would be a
non-lawyer who attempted to tell lawyers their business.
I do not feel constrained from observing, however, that lawyers
can be invaluable in the effort to improve operational safety in
aviation. Far too often we see the lawyer fall prey to the same
disease that afflicts the National Transportation Safety Board; that
is, looking into the accident only far enough to find someone to
* Captain O'Donnell is the President of Air Line Pilots Association.
40 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [42
blame without taking the next logical step of determining why the
individuals acted as they did. From the pilots perspective, finding
the "why" is a must if we are to prevent accidents rather than
merely assess blame. From the litigants' perspective, it would open
new areas of inquiry, broaden the possibilities for recovery, and
spread the liabilities.
These observations provide a spring-board for discussing the
approach and landing segments of flight. Recently, the National
Transportation Safety Board released a report on low visibility
approach and landing accidents. Its data shows that during the
period 1968 through 1972, there were thirty-eight approach and
landing accidents and incidents among air carriers. Of these, forty-
seven percent were straight-in ILS approaches, the most precise of
the instrument approach techniques. In all the air carrier accidents
surveyed, the human element was considered to be a causal factor.
Finally, and most disturbing, the trend of accident statistics over
the last several years clearly indicates that the aviation community
is not making any significant progress in dealing with this most
critical phase of air carrier operation.
In terms of fatal accidents, ALPA recently had occasion to
examine the data for the five year period 1970 through 1974.
These five years are significant for they represent the first five
years' experience under the expedited funding levels for equipment
provided by the Airport/Airways Facilities Development Act of
1970. To our dismay we found that there were seven fatal approach
and landing accidents in 1970 and seven in 1974. In the interven-
ing years there were never fewer than seven nor more than eight.
The total number of air carrier operations was almost identical in
1970 and 1974 (10.3 million in 1970 and 10.4 million in 1974).
All that changed was the number of fatalities, 76 in 1970 versus
366 in 1974, and much of that increase could be attributed to
larger aircraft and better load factors!
These discouraging data have to make anyone interested in im-
proving air safety wonder if we are doomed, much like Sisyphus, to
forever pushing the rock up the hill only to have it roll back again.
ALPA has stated, over and over for a number of years, that there
are serious defects which have existed and are being compounded
rather than resolved.
PILOT OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS
Before you jump to the conclusion that we are being overly
defensive, let me assure you that we do concede that pilots are
human and susceptible to making mistakes. When we see the
highly trained and highly motivated professional pilot make the
same "mistake" with some regularity, however, common sense
would seem to dictate that we carefully examine our criteria for
judging "mistakes" and explore the "why" with diligence. Our
inquiry into the "why" has produced some very interesting insights.
Far too often the aviation community reacts to an accident much
like Ben Wattenberg's observation about liberals in politics: "When
they set up a firing squad, they form a circle." We aim that double-
barrelled weapons of blame and liability at each other rather than
sighting in on the problem!
The handling of the approach and landing problems is a classic!
In most instances the evidence clearly indicates that the accidents
occurring in this phase of flight are not the result of the crew simply
mishandling the aircraft. Almost without exception we find that
the accident happens because of a miscalculation or error in
judgment which is induced by either misinformation, lack of the
necessary information upon which to base a valid judgment, or the
unavailability of adequate visual cues which allow the successful
transition from instrument flight to visual flight necessary to com-
plete the approach successfully. Unfortunately, those charged by
law with regulating for safety refuse to accept these facts. The
accident data indicates that the problem is very complex. It points
to a flight management problem which is occasioned by a myriad
of subordinate issues which run the gamut from airport and air-
craft design philosophy to weather reporting.
The litany of areas to be examined is almost endless: diminished
safety margins in the operation of the aircraft with the resulting
erosion of options available to the pilot, an overload of extraneous
information and a shortage of necessary information, a bias in air
traffic system design which seeks to focus solutions in the ground
based system with the resulting exclusion of the pilot, a filtering
of vital safety information through a ground based non-pilot with
the inevitable faulty subjective judgments being made as to what
information the pilot needs, ill-suited cockpit instrumentation, and
ineffective ground-based equipment which impedes the pilot's efforts
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to cope with the dynamic situation in which he operates, and on
and on! It is a situation in which the manager of the flight is
confronted with incomplete data, inadequate equipment, a frag-
mented decision-making process, and divided responsibility. That
our system enjoys the outstanding safety record that it does is a
testimonial to the ingenuity and initiative of the man located
where the buck stops, the pilot. But none of us is satisfied with an
excellent safety record; we must continue to strive for a spotless
one!
What must be done? First and foremost, there must be a 180
degree turn-about in the philosophy of system design. The pilot is
willing to accept the responsibility for management of his flight;
indeed, he demands that it be his! But this can only be ac-
complished if the information necessary for successful decision-
making is available in a timely fashion in the cockpit. This is purely
and simply an information transfer problem. The concentration of
data generating equipment on the ground with no direct readout
in the cockpit must be curtailed if we are to avoid the inevitable
and unacceptable filtering which now takes place. We must also see
a change in the philosophy which requires the user to accom-
modate to the system rather than the reverse. Over-control by the
ground operators damages and dilutes the decision making process
of the flight crews and tends to lull them into a false sense of
security. It also erodes the incentive of the crews to manage their
flights properly.'
As an aside, we find completely unacceptable the suggestion that
the controller be given the "go-no go" authority regarding wind
shear and other weather phenomena. I recently received a com-
munication from the Federal Aviation Administration which is
four-square with our position:
Consistent with the provisions of Federal Aviation Regulation
91.3, we firmly believe that the final decision for the operation of
an aircraft must remain with the pilot of that aircraft.
We do not believe that controllers can or should assume the re-
sponsibility for denial of approach, landing, or takeoff clearances
based on their assessment of the hazards attendant to thunderstorm
activity. Controllers are neither trained nor qualified to make this
1See generally Litchford, Restructure the ATC System, ASTRONAUTICS &
AERONAUTICS, Feb., 1976, at 32.
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kind of judgment; nor do they have the equipment to aid them in
reaching this kind of decision. Even if the controller's visual ob-
servation is augmented by weather data available on presently used
surveillance radar equipment, there is still insufficient information
available on which to base a sound judgment. We believe that the
"go-no go" decision making responsibility should properly remain
with the pilot-in-command. His responsibility for the safe conduct
of the flight should not be diluted by introducing the judgment of a
person outside the cockpit.'
There must be improvement in the weather reporting system.
Within the U. S. the weather service provided is, to say the least,
an anachronism. It is a throw-back to the system which was cob-
bled together to meet the needs of the pioneering air mail pilots
fifty years ago. The bulk of the resources are used to provide en
route forecasts which are simply irrelevant to the modem transport
aircraft. En route all we need is the information to allow us to
avoid severe weather, but in the highly regimented air traffic
system in which we operate that is not available. As a result,
avoidance of severe weather is a matter of blindman's bluff.
In the immediate vicinity of the airport, where accurate infor-
mation is mandatory for proper flight management, consider the
situation which confronts the IRF pilot. Runway visual range is
information given at the outer marker, by another human, but
then only at the controllers' option, and workload permitting, from
that point through the landing. Runway friction could be made
an exact science and reported directly to the cockpit. It isn't! Wind
velocities could be directly read out in the cockpit. They are not!
The data which is available is available in places other than the
cockpit. So we develop a further information transfer problem.
It is well within our technical capability to instrument our air
transport cockpits to receive real time RVR, wind, temperature,
and even runway condition data. Should not the pilots be the ones
who have the information? Since the control tower was built on
the ground, its operator does not have to land it. Nor does he have
to make a decision. Nor does he, nor indeed can he, appreciate
the significance of all of the information he has at hand. As a
result, his need for the information provided him is certainly less
pressing than the pilot's need. But he has the option of passing it
Letter from FAA Administrator, January 6, 1976.
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on or not, depending on his workload and not on the pilots re-
quirement for it.
There must also be a hard look at current aircraft design and
certification to insure that there are sufficient margins of safety to
allow the crew proper options. The effort to continue to shoe-horn
larger and larger aircraft into what have been becoming smaller
and smaller airports has seriously eroded the options which the
pilot has at his command in the management of his flight. The
same can be said of airport design requirement for adequate aids
to assist in providing the information necessary to allow the transi-
tion from instrument flight to visual landing with the confidence
that the aircraft can be stopped on the available runway.
There is persuasive evidence that, during this critical transition
during landing from IFR to UFR, existing cockpit instruments and
runway lighting systems do not provide the necessary vertical
guidance information to insure the safe and successful landing.'
ALPA believes that this shortcoming may well account for most
of the approach accidents. Unfortunately, the FAA refuses to
accept these facts even though most are gleaned from their test
programs.
In looking at the management of the flight from the perspective
of the crews, the tools they have are much like the golf club, "ill
suited for the task intended!" If anyone were to examine scien-
tifically and spell-out the information necessary for safe operation
of a complex high-performance aircraft on the approach, the list
would almost certainly contain the following: real flight path,
proposed flight path, true aircraft attitude (angle of attack), and
some measure of energy required versus energy available. The
existing instrumentation in transport today simply does not provide
these data. Too much extrapolation is required and too much
extraneous cockpit information must be sorted out and discarded.
What can be done? It is obvious that the problem areas being
discussed are simplifications which in many instances will require
highly technical solutions. There must be a re-direction of the
research and development effort in both the cockpit and the air
traffic system. Better instrumentation which provides the necessary
'DeCelles, Burke and O'Brien, Warnings . . . Approach Lights in Sight, AIR
LINE PILOTS, Feb., 1975, at 27.
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information must be designed and made available, be it heads-up
display or some other modem information system.
If these steps are not taken, there is every indication that we
are doomed to a continuation of the current mislabeled "pilot
error accidents" at essentially the same rate we are now experienc-
ing in the approach and landing phase of the flight. Logic would
seem to dictate that every time we see an accident classified by
the NTSB as "Controlled Flight Into Terrain," as most approach
and landing accidents are, the red flag should go up and we
should all demand that the ultimate question, "Why?" be answered.

